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Abstract 
Parental investments in children can take one of three broad forms: (1) Time investments during 
childhood and adolescence that aid child development, and in particular cognitive ability; (2) 
educational investments that improve school quality and hence educational outcomes; (3) cash 
investments in the form of inter vivos transfers and bequests. We develop a dynastic model of 
household decision-making with intergenerational altruism that nests a child production function, 
incorporates all three of these types of investments, and allows us to quantify their relative 
importance and estimate the strength of intergenerational altruism. Using British cohort data that 
follows individuals from birth to retirement, we find that around 40% of differences in average 
lifetime income by paternal education are explained by ability at age 7, around 40% by 
subsequent divergence in ability and different educational outcomes, and around 20% by inter 
vivos transfers and bequests received so far. 
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1 Introduction 
Intergenerational links are a key determinant of levels of inequality and social mobility, 
with previous work looking at a range of developed economies finding very significant 
intergenerational correlations in education, incomes and wealth (e.g. Dearden et al. 1997; 
Mazumder 2005; Charles and Hurst 2003; Chetty et al. 2014). The literature on understanding 
the mechanisms behind this persistence is much newer. Understanding the drivers of this 
persistence of economic outcomes across generations is crucial for the design of tax and transfer 
policies for two main reasons. First, insofar as the correlations reflect differential parental 
investments in children (both of time and money) they represent an important reason that the 
design of public policy should not treat the distributions of ability, education, earnings, and 
wealth as fixed. Policies designed to mitigate the intergenerational transmission of inequality 
through one channel (e.g., estate taxes) could, by affecting parental investments, increase 
transmission through another channel (e.g., parental spending on children’s education). Second, 
the extent of parental investment in children over the course of their lives provides important 
evidence on the extent of intergenerational altruism — the extent to which parents forgo 
consumption and leisure to invest in their children allows us to estimate the relative weight they 
put on their children’s welfare relative to their own. The degree of intergenerational altruism is a 
key parameter for assessing the potential benefits of social security and tax reform, since current 
generations will only be willing to accept cuts to their benefits in order to reduce budget deficits 
if they are altruistic towards future generations (Fuster et al. 2007). 
In this paper, we develop a dynastic model of household decision-making that incorporates 
three different types of parental investment in children: i) time investments during childhood and 
adolescence that aid child development, and in particular cognitive ability, ii) educational 
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investments that improve school quality and hence educational outcomes, and iii) cash 
investments in the form of inter vivos transfers and bequests. The key contribution of the paper is 
to estimate such a model using unique longitudinal data from a survey that has been running for 
60 years — following a cohort of individuals from birth to retirement. Using these data, we can 
measure parental inputs over the whole life cycle, and hence look directly at early life 
investments of time and goods, estimate a child production function for cognitive ability and link 
that ability measure to earnings in adulthood. The data also include detailed information about 
the schooling received by individuals and the inter vivos transfers they then receive from parents 
during early adult life. 
Using these data, we are able to build and estimate a model capable of speaking to the 
issues raised above. First, we can provide an estimate of the degree of intergenerational altruism 
drawing on data on a number of different investment decisions. Such an estimate is likely to be 
more robust than one based on a single decision (such as how much to leave in bequests) which 
is likely to be affected by a number of other confounding factors. Second, having estimated the 
degree of intergenerational altruism (along with the other structural parameters that govern 
household behaviour), we can run policy counterfactuals and look at how each type of parental 
investment would respond. 
Preliminary analysis of this cohort data suggests that around 40% of differences in average 
lifetime income by paternal education are explained by ability at age 7, around 40% by 
subsequent divergence in ability and different educational outcomes, and around 20% by inter 
vivos transfers and bequests received so far. These findings are supported by results from a 
simple version of the model that has been calibrated to match wealth and labour supply 
moments. Using consumption equivalent variation to measure the welfare gains from higher-
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educated parents, we again find that differences in investments before and after the age of 7 are 
of roughly equal importance in determining lifetime utility differences between children of high- 
versus low-educated parents, with investments in ability and education looking much more 
important than differences in the level of inter vivos transfers and bequests. Looking in more 
detail at investments in ability, we find that higher levels of time investments increase ability, 
and that the ability production function looks to exhibit dynamic complementarity, at least at 
younger ages (see Cunha et al. (2010)). 
Finally, we present estimates of many of the investments that households make in their 
children, including time and money investments. We show that increased investment of time and 
goods of parents leads to higher ability children (as measured by test scores), and this higher 
ability leads to higher wages and incomes later in life. Furthermore, we show that higher income 
parents invest more in their children, and that these investments can explain much of the 
difference in lifetime incomes of children across the parental education distribution. 
This paper relates to a number of different strands of the existing literature, including work 
measuring the drivers of inequality and intergenerational correlations in economic outcomes, the 
large literature seeking to understand child production functions and work on parental altruism 
and bequest motives. The most closely related papers, however, are those focused on the costs of 
and returns to parental investments in children. Our paper is most similar to Lee and Seshadri 
(2016). They develop a model that has many similar features to that used in our paper, but they 
lack data that links investments at young ages to earnings at older ages. As a result, they have to 
calibrate key parts of the model, while we are able to estimate the human capital production 
technology, and show how early life investments and the resulting human capital impacts late 
life earnings. Caucutt and Lochner (2012) is also related to ours. Their paper estimates a human 
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capital production function and altruistic parental transfers to improve human capital of children. 
They find that borrowing constraints are an important deterrent to college going. They use data 
on parental investments at different ages and also later life income, but, unlike us, they cannot 
directly measure early life ability. Furthermore, they restrict the set of investments that can be 
made in children because they do not allow for endogenous labor supply or inter vivos cash 
transfers.  Other closely related papers include Del Boca et al. (2014) and Gayle et al. (2015), 
both of which develop models in which parents choose how much time to allocate to the labour 
market, leisure, and investment in children. Neither paper, however, incorporates household 
savings decisions, and hence, the tradeoff between time investments in children now and cash 
investments later in life. Abbott et al. (2016) focuses on the interaction between parental 
investments, state subsidies, and education decisions, but abstract away from the role of parents 
in influencing ability prior to the age of 16. Castaneda et al. (2003) and De Nardi (2004) build 
overlapping-generations models of wealth inequality that includes both intergenerational 
correlation in human capital and bequests, but does not attempt to model the processes 
underpinning the correlation in earnings across generations. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and documents 
descriptive statistics on ability, education, and parental investments. Section 3 lays out the 
dynastic model used in the paper. Section 4 then provides some reduced-form evidence on the 
impact of parental investments, before Section 5 provides some initial results on the relative 
importance of different channels in explaining intergenerational correlations in education, 
earnings and welfare. Section 6 concludes, and draws out some implications for policy. 
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2 Data and descriptive statistics 
The key data source for this paper is the National Child Development Study (NCDS). The 
NCDS follows the lives of all people born in England, Scotland, and Wales in one particular 
week of March 1958. The initial survey at birth has been followed by subsequent follow-up 
surveys at the ages of 7, 11, 16, 23, 33, 42, 46, 50, and 55.1 During childhood, the data includes 
information on a number of ability measures, measures of parental time investments (discussed 
in more detail below) and parental income. Later waves of the study record educational 
outcomes, receipt of inter vivos transfers, demographic characteristics, earnings, and hours of 
work. For the descriptive analysis in this section, we focus on those individuals for whom we 
observe both their father’s educational attainment (age left school) and their own educational 
qualifications by the age of 33. This leaves us with a sample of 9,436 individuals. 
The main limitation of the NCDS data currently available for our purposes is that we do 
not have data on the inheritances received or expected by members of the cohort of interest. We 
therefore supplement the NCDS data using the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
This is a biennial survey of a representative sample of the 50-plus population in England, similar 
in form and purpose to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the U.S. The 2012-13 wave of 
ELSA recorded lifetime histories of inheritance receipt, and since we also observe father’s 
education in those data, we can use those recorded receipts to augment our description of the 
divergence in lifetime economic outcomes by parental background. We focus on individuals in 
ELSA born in the 1950s, leaving us with a sample of 3,001.2 
                                                 
1 The age-46 survey is not used in any of the subsequent analysis as it was a telephone interview only, and the data 
are known to be of lower quality. 
2 The next wave of the NCDS, which will be in the field next year, is currently planned to collect information on 
lifetime inheritance receipt. We hope to use these new data in later versions of this work. 
6 
In the rest of this section, we document the evolution of inequalities over the life cycle, and 
in particular how they relate to parental background and parental investments over time. 
2.1 Ability and time investments 
We have reading and math test scores for our cohort of interest at the ages of 7, 11 and 16. 
At each age we create our preferred measure of individual ability by taking the average of the 
percentage score on each test, and then normalise to ease interpretation. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of normalised ability at each age, splitting the 
sample according to father’s education (compulsory only, some post-compulsory, some college - 
the proportion of children in each group is shown in the Appendix Table). For this age group of 
fathers, compulsory education roughly corresponds to leaving school at age 14, post-compulsory 
means leaving school between ages 15 and 18, and some college means staying at school until at 
least age 19. It shows that, as one might expect, children whose fathers have a higher level of 
education have higher ability; at the age of 7, 23% of the children of low-education fathers had 
ability around one standard deviation or more below the mean, compared to just 2% of the 
children of high-education fathers. Similarly, 22% of the children of high-education fathers had 
ability around one standard deviation or more above the mean, compared to 7% of the children 
of low-education fathers. 
The second key thing to note from Figure 1 is that ability gaps by father’s education widen 
through childhood. At the age of 7, 44% of the children of low-education fathers have above-
average ability3 compared to 76% of the children of high-education parents - a gap of 32 
percentage points. By age 11, that gap has widened to 42 percentage points, and by age 16 it 
stands at 46 percentage points.  
                                                 
3 That, is their normalised ability is greater than 0.25. 
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Figure 1: Normalised ability at age 7, by parental education 
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Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide some descriptive evidence that at least some of the widening in 
ability gaps by parental characteristics between ages 7 and 16 age can be explained by 
differential parental investments (we investigate this hypothesis more formally in Section 4). 
Table 1 documents parental responses to a question about reading with their child, asked when 
the child is 7. It shows relatively small, but potentially important, differences in the frequency 
with which both mothers and fathers read to their children, splitting families according to the 
education of the father. For example, 34% of fathers with only compulsory education read to 
their 7-year-old children each week, compared to 53% of fathers with some college education. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the child’s teachers assessment of parental interest in the child’s 
education, at the ages of 7 and 11 respectively. The differences by father’s educational 
attainment are perhaps even more striking than those in reading patterns. When the child is 7, 
fathers with some college education are three times more likely to be judged by the teacher to be 
‘very interested’ in their child’s education as fathers with just compulsory education (65% 
compared to 22%). At the age of 11, the gap in paternal interest is very similar, with 72% of 
college-educated fathers judged to be ‘very interested’ in their child’s education, compared to 
25% of fathers with just compulsory education. The tables also show that having a higher-
educated father dramatically reduces the risk of a child having parents with little interest in their 
education. Among those with a college-educated father, only around 10% have a mother or 
father who is judged to show ‘little interest’ in their education at the age of 11. On the other 
hand, among those whose father has only compulsory education that figure rises to around a 
quarter of mothers and nearly half of fathers. 
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Table 1: Frequency with which parents read to age-7 children 
  Father reads... 
  Never Sometimes Every week 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 30% 36% 34% 
Post-compulsory 20% 35% 45% 
Some college 18% 29% 53% 
  Mother reads... 
  Never Sometimes Every week 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 16% 37% 47% 
Post-compulsory 12% 31% 57% 
Some college 10% 23% 67% 
Table 2: Teacher assessment of parental interest in education of age-7 child 
  Father 
  Very interested Some interest Little interest 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 22% 24% 55% 
Post-compulsory 44% 22% 34% 
Some college 65% 15% 20% 
  Mother 
  Very interested Some interest Little interest 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 35% 43% 23% 
Post-compulsory 60% 30% 10% 
Some college 76% 18% 6% 
Table 3: Teacher assessment of parental interest in education of age-11 child 
  Father 
  Very interested Some interest Little interest 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 25% 29% 46% 
Post-compulsory 54% 25% 21% 
Some college 72% 16% 12% 
  Mother 
  Very interested Some interest Little interest 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 35% 38% 26% 
Post-compulsory 61% 27% 12% 
Some college 76% 16% 8% 
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2.2 Educational attainment and school type 
Table 4 shows the correlation in educational attainment between fathers and their children. 
It shows two dramatic impacts of paternal education on educational outcomes. First, having a 
high-educated father makes it much less likely that a child will end up dropping out of high 
school.4 30% of the children of fathers with just compulsory education end up as high-school 
dropouts, compared to only 10% of those whose fathers have some post-compulsory education, 
and just 2% of those whose father have some college education. Second, having a high-educated 
father makes it much more likely that a child will end up with some college education. Fully 
66% of the children of college-educated fathers also end up with some college education, 
compared to only 20% of those whose fathers only have compulsory education. 
Table 4: Intergenerational correlation in education 
  Child’s education 
  High-school 
dropout 
High-school 
graduate 
Some 
college 
Father’s 
education 
Compulsory 30% 50% 20% 
Post-compulsory 10% 47% 43% 
Some college 2% 32% 66% 
Of course, it is in theory possible that all of the intergenerational correlation in education is 
explained by the relationship between parental education and ability documented in the previous 
subsection. However, one might also think that differences in the quality of the schools attended 
by children from different backgrounds also plays a role. In our particular institutional context 
(children attending high school in Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s), a key dimension in 
which schools differed in quality was their ‘type.’ The majority of children attended 
                                                 
4 In the U.K. context, we define ‘high school dropout’ as not having any of the academic qualifications obtained at 
age 16 (formerly O-Levels, now GCSEs). 
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‘comprehensive’ or ‘secondary modern’ public schools that drew their students from across 
society (henceforth we refer to this type of school simply as comprehensive). A small proportion 
attended ’grammar’ schools: public schools to which admittance was by an ability test at the age 
of 11. In addition to the peer effects associated with attendance at such a school, these grammar 
schools attracted much better teachers on average, and were much more focused on university 
(college) attendance than other public schools. Finally, a small minority of children went to 
private schools. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of children across these three different types of school. As 
one might expect, those with higher educated fathers are dramatically more likely to have 
attended higher quality schools. 30% of those whose fathers went to college attended a private 
high school compared to just 2% of those with low-educated fathers, and a further 26% attended 
a grammar school,  compared  to just 9% of those with low-educated fathers. Of course some of 
this discrepancy (particularly in the case of grammar schools) might well be accounted for by the 
differences in ability documented above, but they also reflect differential financial investments in 
children’s education. The most obvious form of educational investment is paying for private 
education, which is much higher quality on average than public education. However, educational 
investments could also take less direct forms, such as paying the house price premium associated 
with living in the neighborhood of a good public school. 
Table 5: High-school type by father’s education 
  Child’s school type 
  Comprehensive Grammar Private 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 89% 9% 2% 
Post-compulsory 68% 18% 13% 
Some college 43% 26% 30% 
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These financial investments differ from inter vivos transfers and bequests in terms of 
timing, but also more importantly in that they directly impact on children’s earnings through the 
returns to education. The relationship between school type and educational attainment, 
conditional on ability, is shown by Figures 2 and 3. We divide our sample into quintiles of ability 
(measured at age 16 in the way de- scribed above), and then plot the probability of completing 
high school and attending college respectively separately for individuals that attended each of the 
three school types. 
Figure 2 shows that at all levels of ability outside the top quintile, children who attend a 
grammar or private school are much more likely to complete high school than those of the same 
ability attending a normal public school. For example, 80% of children in the middle quintile of 
age-16 ability at a comprehensive school complete high school, compared to around 95% of 
those of the same ability who attend either a grammar or private school. 
Figure 3 shows that attendance at private school provides a clear boost to the probability of 
college attendance conditional on age-16 ability. While individuals in the middle quintile of 
ability who attend a comprehensive school have less than a 30% chance of ending up with some 
college education, those with the same ability who attended private school have more than a 40% 
chance. 
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Figure 2: The impact of school type on completing high school 
 
Figure 3: The impact of school type on attending college 
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Table 6: Receipt of inter vivos transfers and bequests by father’s education 
  Inter vivos transfers by age 33 
  Mean (£) Received Mean exc. zeros (£) 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 5,805 24% 24,281 
Post-compulsory 11,071 41% 27,008 
Some college 31,547 55% 56,933 
 
  Inheritances (1950s birth-cohort) 
  Mean (£) Received Mean exc. zeros (£) 
Father’s education 
Compulsory 17,180 26% 66,545 
Post-compulsory 43,901 40% 110,024 
Some college 55,669 46% 120,843 
2.3 Inter vivos transfers and bequests 
Table 6 documents the receipt of inter vivos transfers and bequests of the NCDS cohort so 
far, again splitting by father’s education. As explained at the start of this section, the top panel 
draws on the NCDS data itself, while the bottom panel uses ELSA data instead, as information 
on inheritance receipt is not yet available in the NCDS. 
The table shows that inter vivos transfers are a significant source of economic resources for 
young adults, and that as one would expect are much more significant for those with higher-
educated parents. By the age of 33, 55% of those whose fathers attended college had received an 
inter vivos transfer, of an average of around £50,000. While this is the mean of a highly right-
skewed distribution, these figures indicate an important role for inter vivos transfers relieving 
borrowing constraints in this part of the life cycle. At the same age, 24% of those with low-
educated fathers had received an inter vivos transfer, of an average size of just less than £25,000. 
Evidence from ELSA data suggests that differences in inheritance receipt by parental 
background are also significant. 46% of those with college-educated fathers have received an 
inheritance, compared to 26% of those with low-educated fathers, and among those who have 
received an inheritance, those with college-educated fathers have received around twice as much 
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on average (£120,843 compared to £66,545) . The net result is that those with college-educated 
fathers have inherited around £40,000 more than those with low-educated fathers. This is likely 
to understate the true difference in mean lifetime inheritance receipt between these groups; some 
of those born in the 1950s will still have living parents, and differential mortality means it is in 
fact likely that this applies to a larger share of those with high-educated fathers. 
 3 Model 
This section describes a dynastic model of consumption and labor supply in which parents 
can make different types of transfers to their children. The model can be used to a) evaluate how 
particular intergenerational transfers affect household behavior, b) compare the relative 
insurance value of these types of transfers, and c) simulate household behavior and welfare under 
counterfactual policies (for example, under reforms to estate taxation). Figure 4 provides an 
overview of the dynastic model. During childhood, parental time investments in children and 
money investments in education affect the evolution of the child’s ability and their educational 
attainment. Children are then matched in couples, receive any inter vivos transfer from their 
parents and begin adult life. They then have their own children, and alongside the standard 
choices of consumption and labour supply they choose how much to invest in their own children, 
with implications for their children’s future outcomes. 
16 
Figure 4: The life cycle of an individual 
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We now provide formal details of the model. First, we outline a production function for 
ability, schooling and education in Section 3.1. We then outline the decision problem of a couple 
with a dependent child in Section 3.2. 
3.1 A production function for ability, schooling and education 
This section describes the production function for ability, schooling, and education from 
ages birth to age 23. Over this part of the life cycle, the child makes no decisions. However, their 
parents do make decisions about the investments of time and goods received by their children. 
These choices do not directly impact the contemporaneous utility of the child, but leads to higher 
wages, incomes, and higher quality spouses later in life, which does increase their later life 
outcomes. 
3.1.1 Child ability production function 
A child’s ability at birth is given by: 
 0
00
( , , )abm fabab f ed ed u=  (1) 
where med  and fed  represent the education levels of the child’s parents (m and f index male and 
female respectively) and 00
abu  is a stochastic variable that generates heterogeneity in initial 
ability, conditional  on parental education. Between birth and age 16, child ability updates each 
period according to the transition equation given in (2). The rate of growth of a child’s ability 
depends on his/her parents’ level of education, the time investments ( ,m ft tti ti ) those parents 
make, and the child’s school type (st ). There is also a stochastic component to the ability 
transition equation ( 1
ab
tu + ). 
 1 1( , , , , , , )
m f m f ab
t ab t t t t tab f ab ed ed ti ti st u+ +=  (2) 
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Ability evolves until the age of 16, after which it does not change (ab16 without a subscript 
denotes final ability). 
3.1.2 School type production function 
School type (st) is assumed not to vary between the start of education and the age of 11. At 
the age of 11, school type is realised as one of three outcomes: 1) Private (st = p), 2) Public – 
high quality (st = g), 3) Public – low quality (st = m).5 
Parents can make one or both of two types of money investments in their children’s 
schooling. First, they can pay a quantity of their choosing ( gmi ) to attempt to get their children 
into a high quality public school (one can think of this is paying a premium to locate in a district 
where access to good quality schools is easier). Second they can make money investments in 
private schooling, paying a cost ( pmi p= ), to guarantee that their child gets into a private 
school. We model the outcome of the school type as following a two-stage process. First, the 
child’s type of public school is realised ( gst  is a binary indicator of getting an offer at a high 
quality — or ‘grammar’ school). This is a stochastic function of the child’s ability, parents’ 
education and parent’s choosing to spend money living ( gmi ) in a location where access to good 
schools is easier: 
 11( , , , , )
g
g
g m f g st
st
st f ab ed ed mi u=  (3) 
                                                 
5 This component of the model is motivated by the institutional structure that faced the cohort represented by our 
main data. For this cohort, children took an exam at the age of 11 (the ‘eleven-plus’).  Children who performed well 
in this exam got a place in a selective ‘grammar school.’ Children who performed less well got a place in a 
‘secondary modern’ or ‘comprehensive’ school. In our counterfactual analysis, we will explore scenarios in which 
there is no link between ability and the quality of public schooling. 
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Second, after observing the type of public schooling on offer for their child, parents decide 
whether or not to pay for private schooling. They can accept the public option that their child has 
been given and pay pmi  = 0 or to reject it and pay pmi  = p for private schooling. 
This process can be summarised as follows: 
 
 if 0 and 0
 if 0 and 1
 if                  
p g
p g
p
m mi st
st g mi st
p mi p
ìï = =ïïï= = =íïïï =ïî
  
Total money investments g pmi mi mi= + : the sum of payments aim at gaining access to good 
public schools and those aimed at securing access to private schools. 
3.1.3 Education Production Function 
Education takes one of three values: High School drop out, High School graduate, and 
Some College. It is realised in the period prior to a child turning 23. The education production 
function depends on the (now grown-up) child’s ability, their school quality and a stochastic 
variable ( edu ). 
 ( , , )ededed f ab st u=   
3.2 Parents’ decision problem 
3.2.1 Stages of life 
An individual’s adult life cycle starts at the age of 23 at which point their ability has been 
formed through their parents’ decisions, their education has been realised and they have been 
matched into couples. Their life cycle has three stages. First, there is the early adult phase, from 
the age of 23 to 48 when couples make decisions as a collective unit and have a dependent child. 
There is then a one-period transition phase at the age of 49 which is the last age at which they 
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make decisions on behalf of their child. From the age of 50, their child has grown up and they 
enter their late adult phase. During this phase couples are subject to stochastic mortality risk. 
In outlining the dynastic model we describe below a life-cycle decision problem of a single 
generation. All generations are, of course, linked; each member of the couple whose decision 
problem we specify has parents, and they, in turn, will have children. We will refer to the 
generation whose problem we outline as generation 1, their parents as generation 0, and their 
children as generation 2. In the exposition below, model periods are indexed by the age of the 
members of the couples in generation 1.6 
3.2.2 Initial conditions and marital matching 
Individuals start the decision-making phase of their life in couples at the age of 23. 
Individuals differ at the start of life in their ability, their level of education and their initial 
wealth. The first two are generated according to the production functions with inputs determined 
endogenously by their parents. The third — initial wealth — will come as a cash gift from their 
parents (the parents’ decision problem is outlined below). 
Before they make any decisions, individuals are matched into couples and acquire a 
dependent child at the age of 26. There is probabilistic matching between men and women based 
on education and ability. The probability that a man of education med  and ability mab  gets 
married to a woman with education fed  and ability fab  is given by ( , , , )m m m f fQ ed ab ed ab . The 
(symmetric) matching probabilities for females are ( , , , )f f f m mQ ed ab ed ab .  Everyone is matched 
into couples – there are no singles in the model. 
                                                 
6 That is, subscripts are an index of calendar time, not of age For example, 150()V  is the value function of generation 
1 at  the age of 50, but 250()V  is the value function of generation 2 in the year that generation 1 was 50 years old. 
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3.2.3 Utility and demographics 
The utility of each member of the couple g ∈ {m, f} (male and female respectively) 
depends on their consumption and leisure: 
(1 ) 1( )
( , )
1
g gv v
g
c l
u c l
g
g
- -
=
-
 
We allow the relative preferences for consumption and leisure to vary with gender. 
Household preferences are given by the equally-weighted sum of male and female utility: 
 ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )m f m m f fm fu c l l u c l u c l= +   
and the consumption outcome is efficient within the household. 
Mortality is stochastic — the probability of survival of a couple (we assume that both 
members of a couple die in the same year) to age t + 1 conditional on survival to age t is given 
by 1ts +  . We assume that death is not possible until the household enters the late adult phase of 
life at the age of 50 and that death occurs by the age of 110 at the latest. 
3.2.4 Discounting and intergenerational altruism 
In discounting their future utility, each generation applies a discount factor (β). Each 
generation is altruistic regarding the utility of their offspring (and indeed future generations). In 
addition to the time discounting of their children’s future utility (which they discount at the same 
geometric rate at which they discount their own future utility), they additionally discount it with 
an intergenerational altruism parameter (λ). 
3.2.5 Decision problem in early adult phase of life 
Decisions. During this phase, couples in generation 1, matched into couples are making 
decisions on their own behalf and on behalf of their dependent child (generation 2). They make 
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up to four choices each period. These are (with the time periods in which those decisions are 
taken given in parentheses): 
1. Household consumption – c (each period) 
2. Hours of work for each parent — hm, hf where m and f index hours of work by the 
male and female respectively (each period). We allow each parent to work full-
time, part-time or not at all. 
3. Time investments in children – ti (up to and including the age at which their child 
turns 11) 
4. Private schooling choice (equivalently money investments in children’s education) 
— mi (only at the age that their child turns 11) 
Constraints. Parents face two types of constraints. The first is an intertemporal budget 
constraint at the household level 
 1 (1 )( )t t t t ta r a y c mi+ = + + - -  (4) 
where a is parental wealth, y is household income and the other variables have been defined 
above. Wealth must be non-negative in all periods. The second constraint is a per-parent 
( { , })g m gÎ  intratemporal time budget constraint: 
 g g gt t tT l ti h= + +  (5) 
where T is a time endowment, gl is leisure time and the other variables have been defined above. 
Earnings and Household income. Household income is given by ( , )m fy e et= , where 
τ(.) is a function which returns net-of-tax income and e m and e f  are male and female earnings 
respectively. Earnings are equal to hours multiplied by the wage rate, e.g.: f f ft te h w= .  That 
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wage rate evolves according to a process that has a deterministic component which varies with 
age and a stochastic (AR(1)) component. 
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where PT is a dummy for working part time. While the associated subscripts are suppressed here, 
each of 20 1 2 3 4 5,  ,  ,  ,  {  },  , ,d d d d d d r t  varies by gender (g) and education (Ed). 
Uncertainty. In this phase, couples face uncertainty over the innovation to their wage 
equation, over the stochastic innovations to the child ability production function and the school 
type production function. The joint distribution of these stochastic variables  
( { , , , }e m f ab stt t t t tn u uhºq ) is given by ( )
e e
t tF q . 
State Variables. The vector of state variables for generation 1 during the early adult phase 
of life contains (collected in the vector X1,e): 
1. Age (t), 
2. Assets (a1), 
3. Wage rates (w m,1, w f,1), 
4. Education levels (ed m,1, ed f,1), 
5. Own abilities (ab m,1, ab  f,1), 
6. Child’s gender (g2), 
7. Child’s ability (ab2), 
8. Child’s school type (st2), 
where we make explicit the generation to which the state variable corresponds. 
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Value function. The value function for generation 1 in the early adult phase of life (V 1,e) 
is given below in expression (6): 
 
( ) ( )
,
1, 1, 1, 1,   
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
                 max    ( ,  ,  )    (  )   ( )
m f
t
e e m f e e e e
t t t t t t t t t
c h h ti mi
V u c l l V dFc + + + += + ò X qX   (6) 
s.t. i) the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (4) 
     ii) and the time budget constraints in equation (5) 
3.2.6 Decision problem in the transition phase 
The final period in which a couple is making decisions on behalf of their dependent child 
is when they are 46 (and their child is 23). 
Decisions. During this phase, couples make three sets of choices: 
1. Household consumption – c (each period); 
2. Hours of work for each parent – hm, h f where m and f index hours of work by the 
male and female respectively (each period); 
3. A cash gift (x) to their children. This gift represents inter vivos transfers and 
inheritances. 
Constraints. Parents once again face two types of constraints – an intratemporal time 
constraint and and an intertemporal budget constraint. The former is the same as that given in 
equation 5 in describing the early adult phase of the life cycle (except that time investments in 
children will now always be zero). The intertemporal budget constraint in this phase takes 
account of the cash gifts and is given in equation 7. 
 ( )( )1   1        t t t t ta r a y c x+ = + + - -  (7) 
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State variables The set of state variables (X1,tr) in this phase is that same as in the early 
phase of adulthood (X1,e). 
Uncertainty. Couples now face two distinct types of uncertainty. The first is uncertainty 
regarding their own circumstances next year – that is their next period wage draws  
( 1 1 1{ , }
tr m f
t t th h+ + +ºq  with distribution given by 1 1( )
tr e
t tF + +q ). The second is uncertainty over the 
characteristics of their child the following period. The dimensions of uncertainty here are the 
child’s education, their initial wage draw, and the attributes of their future spouse (his/her ability, 
education level, assets, and initial wage draw). The stochastic variables are collected in a vector 
pt+1, and their joint distribution is given by H(). 
Value function. The decision problem of generation 1 in the transition phase of life is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1, 1,
1 1 1 11, 1,
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1 1 1
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X q
X
X p  (8) 
s.t.  the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (7)  
 and the time budget constraint in equation (5) 
Note that there are two continuation value functions here. The first is the future expected 
utility of that the decision-making couple will enjoy in the next period (when they will enter the 
late adult phase). The value function (given in equation (9)) must be integrated with respect to 
next period’s wage draws, which are stochastic, and discounted by β, the time discount factor. 
The second continuation value function is the expected value of the couple to which the child of 
the generation 1 decision-maker will belong. The (altruistic) parents take this into account in 
making their decisions. This continuation utility is discounted by both the time discount factor 
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and the altruism parameter (λ). This value function is the early adult value function for 
generation 2 (the equivalent for generation 2 of the value function given in equation (6)).7 
3.2.7 Decision problem in the late adult phase 
At this stage the children of generation 1 have entered their own early adult phase and the 
generation 1 couple enters a ‘late adult phase’, 
Decisions. During this phase households make labor supply and consumption/saving 
decisions only. 
Uncertainty. There is uncertainty over their next period wage draws ( 1 1 1{ , }
l m f
t t th h+ + +ºq  
with distribution given by 1 1 ( )
l l
t tF + +q  and there is now stochastic mortality (where assume that 
both members of the couple die in the same period). 
State variables. The vector state variables (X1,l) during the late adult phase of life are the 
same as those for the early adult phase except that the (now-grown-up) child’s ability is no 
longer a state variable): 
1. Age (t) 
2. Assets (a) 
3. Wage rates (wm, wf ) 
4. Education levels (ed  m, ed  f ) 
5. Own abilities (ab m, ab f ) 
  
                                                 
7 Recall that the timing convention that we index all value functions in this exposition by the age of generation 1. 
That is, 2, 1 
e
tV +  is the value function for generation 2 when generation 1 is aged t + 1. 
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Value function. The decision problem in the ‘late adult’ phase of life can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
1 ,1 ,1
1, 1, 1, 1,
1 1 1
, ,
                  max     ( ,  ,  )     ( ) ( )  
m f
t
l l m f l l l
t t t t t t t t l
c h h
V u c l l s V dFc + + += + òX X q  (9) 
s.t. the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (4)  
and the time budget constraint in equation (5) 
where st+1 is the probability of surviving to period t + 1, conditional on having survived to  
period t. 
4 Evidence on the returns to parental investments 
In this section, we present regression analysis that relates parental time investments to 
children’s ability, and then in turn relates that ability to their adult earnings. This exploits a key 
advantage of our data — that we measure for the same individuals their parents’ investments, 
their ability, and the value of that ability in the labour market. 
4.1 The effect of time investments on ability 
In Section 2, we documented that the ability of children of higher-educated parents rises 
faster through childhood than the ability of other children, and that their parents spent more time 
reading to them and were more interested in their educational progress. We now look more 
formally at the relationship between those two facts using a simple regression framework. 
To create a unidimensional measure of the time investments of parents in children 
(something that is required for the model outlined in Section 3 to be tractable) we extract a 
principal component factor from our proxies for the time investments of each parent, which is 
then normalised for ease of interpretation. At the age of 7, those proxies are frequency of reading 
with the child (for mother and father), teacher’s assessment of interest in education (for mother 
and father) and frequency of outings with the child (for mother and father). At the age of 11, the 
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proxies are library attendance, teacher’s assessment of interest in education and frequency of 
outings with the child (for mother and father). 
4.1.1 Ability between 7 and 11 
At the age of 11, we estimate the regression: 
 ,11 ,7 ,7 ,7 ,11            
m m f f AB
i i i i i iAB AB TI TI ED uw a c c d= + + + + +   (10) 
where AB is normalised ability, TI m is our (normalised) measure of mothers’ time investments, 
TI  f is our (normalised) measure of fathers’ time investments, and ED is parents’ education. This 
can be thought of as a simple approximation of equation 2, which governs the evolution of 
ability as the child ages (school type does not enter as it is constant across individuals until the 
age of 11). 
The results from this regression equation are presented in Table 7. It shows that time 
investments have a significant effect on changes in ability over time, even after conditioning on 
background characteristics and initial ability. A one-standard deviation increase in maternal time 
investments at age 7 raises age-11 ability by 0.07 of a standard deviation, and a one-standard 
deviation increase in paternal time investments at age 7 raises age-11 ability by 0.04 of a 
standard deviation. These are relatively small effects, but are clearly statistically significant. 
  
29 
Table 7: Effect of time investments on the evolution of ability: 7 to 11 
 (1) 
 Normalised age-7 ability 
Normalised age-11 ability 0.628 (0.00704) 
Normalised age-7 maternal time investments 0.0739 (0.00845) 
Normalised age-7 paternal time investments 0.0427 (0.00841) 
N 10815 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regression includes controls for parental education. 
Table 8 presents evidence of dynamic complementarity in the ability production function 
by adding to the estimating equation 10 interaction terms of child ability and time investments 
(see Agostinelli and Wiswall 2016). ‘Dynamic complementarity’ occurs when the return on 
present investments is higher if the initial level of the outcome variable (in this case ability) is 
higher, making past and present investments complements. We test for dynamic 
complementarity through a simple interaction of the return to parental time investments with the 
level of the child’s ability at the age of 7. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on 
these interaction terms indicates that the ability production function does, in fact, exhibit 
dynamic complementarity at this stage of childhood, with higher returns on time investments in 
children with higher initial ability (as found by Cunha et al. 2010). 
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Table 8: Dynamic complementarity in ability production function: 7 to 11 
 (1) 
 Normalised age-11 ability 
Normalised age-7 maternal time investments 0.0769 (0.00848) 
Normalised age-7 ability × Normalised age-7 
maternal time investments 
0.0176 
(0.00825) 
Normalised age-7 paternal time investments 0.0417 (0.00840) 
Normalised age-7 ability × Normalised age-7 
paternal time investments 
0.0168 
(0.00849) 
N 10815 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Regression includes controls for parental education and age-7 ability 
4.1.2 Ability between 11 and 16 
At the age of 16, we estimate the regression: 
 ,16 ,11 ,11 ,11 ,16            
m m f f AB
i i i i i i iAB AB TI TI ED st uw a c c d k= + + + + + +  (11) 
where the sole difference from the equation estimated at age 11 is the addition of the individual’s 
school type st — comprehensive (the base category), grammar and private. 
Table 9 shows the results from this regression. There are three key things to note. First, the 
coefficients on parental time investments are smaller than in the previous period, reflecting the 
fact that it is harder to affect ability between the ages of 11 and 16 than between 7 and 11 — as 
also shown by the larger coefficient on last period’s ability. Second, the relative importance of 
mothers’ and fathers’ time investments are estimated to have reversed (though the difference 
between the two coefficients in the age-16 regression is not statistically significant). The point 
estimates suggest that an additional standard deviation of maternal time investments between 11 
and 16 yield an increase of 0.03 of a standard deviation in age-16 ability, compared to an 
increase of 0.05 of a standard deviation for every additional standard deviation of paternal time 
investments. Third, school type is estimated to have a very significant impact on ability at 11 
31 
conditional on ability at 16. Relative to attending a comprehensive school, attending a private 
school is associated with an increase of 0.10 of a standard deviation in age-16 ability, and 
attending a grammar school is associated with an increase of 0.17 of a standard deviation. 
Table 9: Effect of time investments on the evolution of ability: 7 to 11 
 (1) 
 Normalised age-16 ability 
Normalised age-11 ability 0.760 (0.00740) 
Normalised age-11 maternal time investments 0.0308 (0.0117) 
Normalised age-11 paternal time investments 0.0452 (0.0117) 
Grammar 0.177 (0.0197) 
Private 0.101 (0.0289) 
N 7302 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regression includes controls for parental education. 
Table 10 shows the results when interactions of ability and time investments measures are 
included. These results suggest that, unlike investments between the ages of 7 and 11, there is 
not much evidence for dynamic complementarity between time investments between 11 and 16 
and previous investments. In fact, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction between age-11 ability and subsequent paternal investments is evidence for the 
opposite of dynamic complementarity: During teenage years father’s time investments have the 
biggest impact for children with less ability at the age of 11. 
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Table 10: Dynamic complementarity in ability production function: 11 to 16 
 (1) 
 Normalised age-16 ability 
Normalised age-11 maternal time investments 0.0249 (0.0117) 
Normalised age-11 ability × Normalised age-11 maternal time 
investments 
0.00129 
(0.0122) 
Normalised age-11 paternal time investments 0.0530 (0.0118) 
Normalised age-11 ability × Normalised age-11 paternal time 
investments 
-0.0380 
(0.0122) 
N 7302 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Regression includes controls for parental education, school type and age-11 ability. 
4.2 The effect of ability on earnings 
In the dynastic model with intergenerational altruism laid out in Section 3, parents do not 
receive any direct return from their children having higher ability at the age of 16. Instead, they 
include their children’s expected lifetime utility in their own value function, with a weight 
determined by the intergenerational altruism parameter λ. Hence parental investments in 
children’s ability (both through time and money investments in education) will be driven by the 
return to ability in the labour and marriage markets. Here we focus on the return to ability in the 
labour market, as measured by its impact on wages. We estimate the wage equation laid out in 
Section 3: 
 2 30 1 2 3 4 16 5ln t tw t t t lnab PT vd d d d d d= + + + + + +   (12) 
for each gender and education group. Of course, ability has an important indirect impact on 
wages through its relationship with education, but it also has a direct impact on wages 
conditional on education. This is shown by Table 11, which plots the estimates of δ4 for each 
gender and education group. The interpretation of these coefficients is that they are estimates of 
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the log-point increase in wages associated with a log-point increase in age-16 ability, conditional 
on education. 
Table 11: Log-point change in earnings for a 1 log-point increase in ability 
 Male Female 
High-school dropout 0.16 0.20 
High-school graduate 0.31 0.29 
Some college 0.55 0.38 
The table shows that, as one would expect, age-16 ability has a significant positive impact 
on wages conditional on education for all groups. Perhaps more interesting, it finds evidence of 
complementarity between education and ability in the labour market, particularly for men. While 
male high-school dropouts see only a 0.15 log-point increase in hourly wages for every 
additional log-point of ability, men with some college education see an average increase of 0.55 
log-points in hourly wages for every additional log-point of ability. 
5 Results 
In this section we present some findings on the quantitative importance of different 
investments and stages of childhood in explaining the intergenerational transmission of 
economic advantage. First, we conduct a simple ’back of the envelope’ exercise in decomposing 
the difference in lifetime income between individuals from different parental backgrounds into 
the proportions explained by different channels of investment. This is limited in a number of 
ways discussed below, but provides powerful suggestive evidence about the sources of 
intergenerational transmission of inequality. Second, we use a simplified version of the model 
described in Section 3 to quantify the differences in expected lifetime utility by parental 
education, and to decompose those differences into the proportions explained by different 
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channels. This provides a more comprehensive measure of the relative importance of different 
channels, at the cost of relying on the structure of the model. 
5.1 Decomposing the difference in lifetime income by parental education 
In this analysis, we quantify the difference in expected lifetime income (as defined below) 
across children with fathers of the three different education levels defined and discussed in 
Section 2: compulsory, some post-compulsory and some college. 
5.1.1 Methods 
In this analysis, we focus on male members of the NCDS cohort, and define lifetime 
income as the sum of gross earnings during prime working age (between the ages of 25 and 55), 
plus any cash transfers and bequests from parents. 
Differences in cash transfers and bequests from parents can be directly observed in the 
NCDS and ELSA data respectively, as reported in Table 6. To calculate differences in prime-age 
earnings we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the earnings equation given in Sections 3 
and 4. Second, we calculate in the NCDS data the distribution across education and ability levels 
of individuals with each level of father’s education. By combining these two things, we can 
calculate expected lifetime earnings for each paternal education group. 
Having calculated expected earnings for each paternal education group given the actual 
distributions of ability and education within each group, we then do the same calculation for 
three counterfactual distributions of ability and education across each paternal education group: 
1. We predict the distribution of age-16 ability and education for each paternal 
education group conditional on age-7 ability. Differences in expected earnings 
across groups in this scenario reveal how much of observed differences in earnings 
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by paternal education can be explained by the differences in ability at age 7 shown 
in the first panel of Figure 1. 
2. We predict the distribution of age-16 ability in the absence of differences in school 
type, and then predict education solely on the basis on that counterfactual age-16 
ability distribution. The difference between expected earnings in this scenario and 
the previous one captures the effects of the faster growth in ability between 7 and 
16 for children of higher-educated fathers, at least some of which is explained by 
the higher level of parental time investments in those children (as shown by the 
analysis in Section 4). 
3. We use the actual distribution of age-16 ability, but predict the education 
distribution for each group on the basis of age-16 ability and school type, ignoring 
other factors. The difference between expected earnings in this scenario and the 
previous scenario captures the effects of schooling differences on lifetime earnings. 
The difference between expected earnings in this scenario and true expected 
earnings captures the effect on lifetime earnings of other drivers of educational 
outcomes besides ability and school type. 
5.1.2 Results 
Overall differences in expected lifetime income (as defined above) for men with different 
levels of paternal education are shown in the first row of Table 12. Those with mid-educated 
fathers have expected incomes more than £150,000 higher than those with low-educated fathers, 
and the gap between those with low- educated and high-educated fathers is almost exactly 
£300,000. For reference, the lifetime income of those with low-educated fathers is a little more 
than £850,000. 
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The rest of Table 12 decomposes these differences into distinct contributing factors. 
• The first row of the decomposition shows differences in lifetime earnings in the 
first counterfactual scenario described above (age-16 ability and education 
predicted on the basis of age-7 ability). It shows that around 40% of the differences 
in lifetime income can be explained by differences in age-7 ability. 
• The second row shows the difference between the first two counterfactual scenarios 
described above. It reveals faster growth in ability between 7 and 16 (not explained 
by different school types) explains around £23,000 of the gap between the children 
of low and mid-educated fathers, and around £39,000 of the gap between the 
children of low- and high-educated fathers (around 15% of the total gap in both 
cases). 
• The third row shows the difference between the second and third counterfactual 
scenarios - schooling differences. The fact that those with higher-educated fathers 
are more likely to have attended private or grammar schools explains a little under 
10% of the total differences in lifetime income 
• The fourth row shows the difference between the final counterfactual scenario and 
actual expected earnings for each group. It suggests that differences in educational 
attainment conditional on ability and school type (explained by, for example, the 
role of financial support from parents) explains nearly 20% of the total gap in 
lifetime incomes across those from different parental backgrounds. It is perhaps 
surprising that differences in educational attainment conditional on school type and 
ability are twice as important in explaining differences in lifetime income as 
differences in school type. 
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• The final row of the Table simply documents differences in average inter vivos 
transfers and bequests across paternal education groups. It shows that around 20% 
of the differences in lifetime income across these groups are attributable to 
differences in transfers and bequests, rather than differences in earnings. 
To summarise, the decomposition analysis suggests that around 40% of the difference in 
lifetime income across paternal education groups is attributable to differences in ability at age 7, 
around 40% by subsequent divergence in ability and different educational outcomes, and around 
20% by inter vivos transfers and bequests received so far. Thus, while inter vivos transfers are 
important, most of the lifetime differences in lifetime income between children of low- versus 
high-education fathers are realized by the age of 16. 
Table 12: Decomposition of differences in lifetime income by father’s education 
 Father’s education 
 Some post-compulsory Some college 
Total difference £156,000 £299,000 
Accounted for by...   
Age-7 ability £68,000 £115,000 
Evolution of ability 7-16 £23,000 £39,000 
School type differences £11,000 £26,000 
Attainment given ability and school type £26,000 £58,000 
Inter vivos transfers and bequests £28,000 £61,000 
Memo: Lifetime income for those with low-educated fathers: £854,000 
Notes: Differences relative to those with low-educated fathers (compulsory education only).  
Figures calculated for men. 
5.2 Decomposing the difference in expected lifetime utility by parental education 
There are a number of limitations with a comparison of expected lifetime incomes across 
individuals with different levels of parental education. Perhaps the most significant is that what 
individuals care about is the ex-ante difference in expected welfare, or expected utility. In this 
section we use a simplified version of the model laid out in Section 3 to estimate ex-ante 
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expected lifetime utility for children with each level of parental education, expressed using 
compensating variation. 
5.2.1 Methods 
The key simplification in the model used to estimate the results reported in this section is 
that we do not include intergenerational links - couples choose consumption and labour supply 
but not investments in their children. Hence the decision problem that households face 
corresponds to that described as the ‘late adult phase’ in Section 3. As a result, we do not explore 
how education and age-16 ability are determined within the model, but instead simply use the 
model to estimate expected lifetime utility given education and ability.8 We calibrate the 
preference parameters of this simplified model to match labour supply and wealth moments. 
Our approach then roughly follows that described in the previous section. We first use the 
model to estimate expected lifetime utility for each level of education and ability, and then 
combine that with the distribution of individuals from each parental background across education 
and ability to estimate the actual expected lifetime utility for each level of father’s education. 
Then we can use the counterfactual distributions of education and ability discussed above to 
estimate expected lifetime utility for each parental education group in each of the counterfactual 
scenarios discussed. In order to provide a meaningful quantification of these differences in 
expected lifetime utility we calculate the consumption equivalent variation (CEV). This is the 
percentage increase in consumption in every state of the world required to make the children of 
                                                 
8 We also make a few further simplifications with respect to the model described in Section 3; namely, marital 
matching is on education only, we only allow individuals to choose whether to work full-time or not at all (no part-
time choice), there are no earnings-related pensions (though each individuals receives a flat rate pension in 
retirement) and preference parameters are not gender specific. 
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less-educated fathers indifferent between their ex-ante situation and that of those born to high-
educated fathers. 
5.2.2 Results 
Table 13 shows the results from these CEV calculations. The first row of the table shows 
the total compensating variation required to make the children of low-educated fathers 
indifferent to being born to a mid-educated father (left-hand column) and a high-educated father 
(right-hand column). We estimate that the consumption of children of low-educated fathers in 
every state of the world would need to be increased by 6% for them to be indifferent with the 
children of mid-educated fathers, and by 12% for them to be indifferent with the children of 
high-educated fathers. 
The rest of Table 13 decomposes these differences into distinct contributing factors. 
• The first row of the decomposition shows differences in lifetime earnings in the 
first counterfactual scenario (age-16 ability and education predicted on the basis of 
age-7 ability). It shows that around 40% of the differences in expected lifetime 
utility (as measured by the CEV) can be explained by differences in age-7 ability. 
This is extremely similar to the proportion of the differences in lifetime income 
explained by age-7 ability in Table 12. 
• The second row reveals faster growth in ability between 7 and 16 (not explained by 
different school types) explains between 15 and 20% of the differences in expected 
lifetime utility. 
• The third row shows that schooling differences explain around 10% of the 
differences in expected lifetime utility - again a very similar result to that shown for 
expected lifetime income in Table 12. 
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• The fourth row shows that differences in educational attainment conditional on 
ability and school type (explained by, for example, the role of financial support 
from parents) explains around 30% of the total gap in expected lifetime utility 
across those from different parental backgrounds - a larger proportion than the 20% 
it explains of the difference in our measure of lifetime income. One potential reason 
for this is that the return to college attendance in the model is compounded by the 
existence of assortative matching in the marriage market - something not captured 
in our simple lifetime incomes analysis. 
• The final row of the Table shows that inter vivos transfers explain only 2% of the 
difference in expected lifetime utility between those with low- and mid-educated 
fathers, and only 7% of the difference between low- and high-educated fathers. 
This is somewhat in contrast to the findings presented in Table 12, which show that 
inter vivos transfers and bequests explain around 20% of the differences across 
parental education in our measure of lifetime income. One reason for this 
difference is simply that bequests are not incorporated in the model, but perhaps 
more important is that these kinds of intergenerational transfers are extremely 
unequally distributed. Hence while they might have a meaningful impact on mean 
lifetime resources, from an ex-ante perspective they have very little effect on 
expected utility. 
To summarise, this analysis of consumption equivalent variation (CEV) largely reinforces 
the conclusion of the previous analysis of expected lifetime income. Again, around 40% of the 
differences between those from different parental backgrounds can be explained by differences 
in ability by the age of 7, with the vast majority of the rest of the discrepancies being driven by 
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later differences in ability and educational attainment, rather than cash transfers from parents to 
children. In fact, this analysis reinforces the conclusion that most of the meaningful differences 
between children of low- versus high-education fathers are realized by the age of 16. 
Table 13: Decomposition of differences in expected lifetime utility by father’s education 
 Father’s education 
 Some post-compulsory Some college 
Total compensating variation 5.9% 12.3% 
Accounted for by...   
Age-7 ability 2.6% 4.8% 
Evolution of ability 7-16 1.2% 2.0% 
School type differences 0.6% 1.3% 
Attainment given ability and school type 1.6% 3.9% 
Inter vivos transfers 0.1% 0.9% 
6 Conclusions and policy implications 
Understanding intergenerational links, and in particular the role of parental investments, is 
crucial for policymakers seeking to design redistributive tax and transfer policies that mitigate 
inequalities and improve social mobility, and wishing to understand the degree of 
intergenerational altruism (and hence the willingness of one generation to make sacrifices for 
another). In this paper we have documented substantial differences between children from 
different backgrounds in the evolution of cognitive ability through childhood, school quality and 
educational outcomes, and cash transfers received from their parents. A quantification of the 
implications of this differences for lifetime incomes suggests that around 40% of the gap 
between the sons of low- and high-educated fathers can be attributed to ability differences at the 
age of 7, a further 40% to subsequent differences in ability and educational attainment, and the 
final 20% to differences in the amount of inter vivos transfers and bequests received. The relative 
importance of these different stages of life and forms of investment is also found when using a 
simple calibrated model to estimate the welfare gains from better parents (as measured using 
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consumption equivalent variation). We provide evidence that at least some of the differences in 
ability and education are attributable to parental time investments in children and investments in 
school quality respectively. 
All this has a number of implications for economic policy. At the most general level, the 
paper shows that policymakers interested in tackling the intergenerational transmission of 
inequalities need to consider policies designed to counter the inequality-increasing effects of 
each of the three forms of parental investment, since each proves to be quantitatively important 
in driving inequalities in income. Moreover, policymakers should bear in mind the 
substitutability of these different forms of investment - any attempt to shut down one channel of 
parental investments is likely to provoke a shift towards investment in other forms. In fact, the 
elasticity of substitution between these different forms of investment is a key determinant of the 
optimal policy response, and is something we will quantify in later versions of this paper. 
A Appendix Table  
Table 14: Proportion of children in each father’s education group 
 Father’s education 
Compulsory  75% 
Post-compulsory  20% 
Some college  5% 
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